Succinctly Summing up the Santorum Surge

Like it or Not: IA+NH=Important

All of my posts on this subject, for those who are interested in my reasoning and/or wish to examine the evidence for themselves are as follows (in chronological order):

• Ron Paul’s Newsletter Problem

• More on Paul and the Newsletters

• A Bit More About the Ron Paul Newsletters

• If You Need an Example of the Ron Paul Newsletter

• More Examples of the Ron Paul Newsletters

• Even More Ron Paul Newsletter Scans

• Libertarian History and the Paul Newsletters

• Ron Paul: Not So Much Denial Back in the 1990s (Plus: Newsletters 101)

From me @OTB:  9-9-9 and the Institutional Structure of the US Government.

Real gross domestic product — the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States — increased at an annual rate of 2.5 percent in the third quarter of 2024 (that is, from the second quarter to the third quarter) according to the "advance" estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the second quarter, real GDP increased 1.3 percent.

Hardly a house afire, but something.

In response to the “Nuclear Option Lite” move my Senate Majority Leader Reid to use a majority vote to change the rules over a particular type of amendment at a specific moment in the legislative process, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell stated on the floor:  “We are fundamentally turning the Senate into the House” and “The minority’s out of business.”

Now, hyperbole on the floor of a legislative chamber is hardly a new thing in the annals of politics.  Further, it is likely that McConnell knew full well that he was exaggerating, to put it mildly.  However, this is hardly either “turning the Senate into the House” and the minority remains firmly in business.

First, it needs to be understood that the motion to change the rules in this case was targeted on a very specific parliamentary maneuver and is hardly filibuster reform. It does demonstrate the mechanism (which has acquired the popular appellation “Nuclear Option”) by which the majority could substantially alter the filibuster over the objections of the minority.  However, there is a lot less here than that (the exact discussion of what happened and why deserves another post).  As such, McConnell’s statement is not just hyperbole, but hyperbole squared (he said, risking sounding hyperbolic).

Second, even if we take McConnell’s hyperbole at face value, the fact of the matter remains that a Senate operating under basic majority rules would hardly be the House.  This is rather easy to demonstrate by some basic numbers.  If we look at the current Senate and the 2024 Census figures for state populations we find that the representational scheme in the Senate is, as should be obvious, substantially different than that in the House, which means that the kinds of outcomes one is likely to get from a majority-base Senate would still be rather different than the House).

To wit:  The top 25 states in population contains 257,763,289 persons, or 83.65% of the population of the states.  The bottom 25 states in population contains 50,380,536 persons, or 16.35% of the population of the states (such numbers exclude residents in DC, Puerto Rico and other territories).

To put it simply:

Top 50% of Senate represents 83.65% of the population of the states.

Bottom 50% of Senate represents 16.35% of the population of the states.

So, even if the Senate operated by majority votes the same way the House does, the relative power of huge chunks of the population (and their interests) are represented rather differently in the Senate than in the House.  And yes, I do understand that partisan factors change this dynamic from a large v. small state one to one of red v. blue states.  Of course, it is worth noting that co-equal representation of the states gives the Republicans a representational edge relative in the Senate.  This is a structural advantage in the Senate given that, as we know, more rural states (i.e., small-to-mid-ranger pop. states)  tend to be more conservative/Republican leaning and large metropolitan areas (i.e., often in larger pop. states) tend to lean liberal/Democratic.  The smaller, rural states grow slowly, yet retain their two Senators while the metro areas tend to grow at a faster rate, yet the states with state metro areas also retain their two Senators.  The extreme, yet real, example:  California (with its 37,253,956)  will grow at a faster rate than Wyoming (with its 563,626) and yet they will continue to have the same amount of power in the Senate (majority rules or not).

Having said all of that, it has to be understood that changing the rules on just one delaying tactic is hardly a radical transformation of the Senate.  Now, it could spark a wider fight that might, over time, lead to significant rules changes.  But even then, the Senate would be rather unlikely to become the House.  The differences between the House and Senate are not so simple that they can be reduced to the House functions under majoritarian rules and the Senate functions under supermajority rules (effectively of late, anyway).  There is a long list of rules and processes that would have to replicated in the Senate to make it the House.  This cannot be stressed enough:  the differences between the House and Senate are far more complicated than simply the majority/supermajority issue.  We also have to understand that the last decade or so has seen a substantial increase in the minority using these mechanisms to block basic business.  As such, we have seen the Senate operate far more under majority rule for much of its history and it hardly looked like the House in terms of operation.

Quite frankly, I would welcome a fight over the rules of the Senate, as the status quo is unacceptable if we actually want the Congress to be functional.  The chamber needs reform to its rules, and it will likely take a fight to spark changes (such is the way of politics).

A parting number:  under the current rules it is possible for a coalition of the 20 least populated states plus one Senator from the next least populated state to have the 41 votes needed to block Senate action.  This coalition would represent all of 10.8% of the population of the states.

From me @OTB:  Florida Moves its Primary.

From me @OTB:  Does Debate Performance Matter?

I could likely write a book* about the topic of Doug Mataconis’ post from this afternoon (Would America Be Better Off With A Parliamentary Government?), so containing the multiple thoughts running through my head at the moment so that I go one post at a time is something of a challenge at the moment.  I know that I could teach a class about it, since what I am about to write is actually the topic of one of my lectures for Monday, so I can treat this blog post as lecture prep (hooray for multitasking!).

There is a lot in Doug’s post (and the debate that Zakaria and others started) that I could comment upon, but let me focus on one sentence:

Our current problems aren’t James Madison’s fault, they are ours alone.

The reference to James Madison especially caught my eye (and I certainly understand why Doug references the Father of the Constitution) but the overall theme of the piece is very much steeped in the notion of the intent of the Framers regarding our institutions.  This leads my mind to some interesting facts about the Convention and that fact that separation of powers and presidentialism as we currently understand it were not the plan going into Philadelphia.

It is true that James Madison wrote in Federalist 51 an impressive account of the workings of separation of powers and checks and balances.  It is sufficiently brilliant that it transcends its role as a political commercial to become a key piece of political theory.  However, I think we frequently forget that the Federalist Papers were originally persuasive essays written after the convention was done with its work, so obviously they make it sound as if a master plan was deployed in Philadelphia.  Indeed, if Madison had gotten his way, we would have a different structure to our national government than we currently have because Madison’s original plan for the constitution did not contain full separation of powers, it had fusion of powers.**  By fusion of powers in this case I mean that the executive would derive from the legislature (as in the case in parliamentary systems).

The really interesting thing is that we end up with arguments about, as Madison put it, "ambition countering ambition" in the context of separated powers and checks and balances after the pieces were designed.  In other words, the more grandiose theoretical explanations for how the system would work were largely ex post facto reasonsing rather than the starting spot that lead to the institutional design we currently see.   As such, I would argue that the following from Doug is a bit too cut and dry (although it is a common narrative):

While the Founders recognized the fact that the Articles of Confederation were simply impractical for governing even a small nation located on the eastern coast of North America, they also recognized the dangers of centralized power. That’s why they created a system where three co-equal branches of government are, if things operate as intended, supposed to check each others power, where the states act as checks on the power of the Federal Government, and where the people act as checks on both. It’s an imperfect system, because it was designed by imperfect men for imperfect people, but what Zakaria is really criticizing, it seems, is that the system is actually working the way it was intended to.

A side note that will require another post to explain, separation of powers is not an institutional feature linked to "the dangers of centralized power"–an issue more linked to federalism than the design of executive-legislative relations.  For example Australia, Canada,  and Germany all have very federal systems but also have parliamentarism.   In other words:  you can have federalism and parliamentarism.  (I do agree with Doug that the system is operating mostly as designed, although I think that one can legitimately criticize a system even if it is working as it is supposed to work).

Back to the question of legislative-executive design and Madison, a quick trip to the archives takes us to the Virginia Plan (written by Madison in advance of the Philadelphia convention in 1787 and formerly submitted by Edmund Randolph on his behalf to the convention on May 29, 1787). In that plan, Madison proposed the following:

7. Res^d that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of years…

Here we see that executive being chosen by the legislature (a legislature, by the way, where the Senate was chosen by the House, but that’s another discussion).  Indeed, of the four major plans (i.e., basic outlines for the basis for debate for a replacement for the Article of Confederation) three had a similar provision to have the executive chosen by the legislature.  The four plans were the aforementioned Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan (the oft-discussed small state alternative to the Virginia Plan), the Pickney Plan, and the Hamilton Plan.

Here’s the NJ Plan language:

4. Resd that the U. States in Congs be authorized to elect a federal Executive to consist of persons…

And here’s the Pickney Plan language:

5. The Senate and H. D. shall by joint Ballot annually chuse the Presidt U. S. from among themselves or the People at large.-In the Presdt the executive authority of the U. S. shall be vested.- His Powers and Duties-He shall have a Right to advise with the Heads of the different Departments as his Council

(H.D. = "House of Delegates" or the lower house).

Two quick sidenotes:  the NJ Plan would have created a committee to play the role of chief executive, and Hamilton’s version would have created an elected executive for life called the Governor.

Had we gone in the direction of any of the three plans that vested selection of the executive in the legislature, it is possible*** that the US system would have evolved more along the lines of parliamentarism as opposed to the presidential system that was originally created.  At a minimum, such provisions would have created executives less independent of the legislature than evolved under a system in which the executive was selected wholly apart from the legislature.  An interesting side note, in fact, was that even under the constitution as passed, there was an assumption that the House of Representatives would normally choose the president because it was thought it would be commonplace for the electoral college to fail to produce a winner with an absolute majority of electoral votes.

There are other issues apart from who selected the executive, including the issue of removal, fixed terms, veto powers and so forth that also play into the question of how separate or how fused the executive and legislative powers are.  And indeed, such issues may have arisen if the conventioneers had not decided (fairly late in the process) to go with the president being selected by  the electoral college.

Indeed, if one reads the Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention one find that a great deal of the discussion was about the legislature, with a lot less time being devoted to the presidency.  This is reflected both in the amount of time the conventioneers spent on the shape and scope of the legislature, but in the fact that Article I of the constitution (about the Congress) is much longer and more detailed than is Article II (about the presidency).  Certainly Madison was far more focused on the legislature than he was on the executive.

One of things about all of this that is noteworthy is that this cuts deeply into the narrative (indeed, the myth) of the Philadelphia Convention being the result of clear design that sprung forth fully developed from the collective genius of the Framers.  Yes, there was some genius going on, but it was, at least in part, the genius of political compromise as much as it was master planning.   It further demonstrates that understanding of the current political system is not simply an issue of looking back of what was "intended" by the Framers.

A topic I find especially interesting is that we, as a country, rarely even talk about issues of institution reform.  Our default position is that our institutions are keen and therefore suggestion to change them are treated almost immediately as crazy talk.

I will set aside the issue of my preferences on the topic (I am actually a bit ambivalent and I also know that the odds of such changes are so close to zero as to render the discussion moot save for the intellectual exercise of it all).  Certainly none of the above should be construed as an argument for parliamentarism.  Mostly, I just find it all rather interesting.  I would, however, very much welcome a national dialog on institutional issues.

—

*I feel this way because I am actually currently getting close to finishing a co-authored text that falls in this general topic area of institutional design in democracy.  Specific news will be shared when warranted.

**Madison’s view on functional republican government (what we would call "representative democracy" going into the convention was a system of factional balancing in a large country (see Federalist 10, which was a rework of some of his pre-convention work that does not mentioned separation of power nor checks and balances—it makes for an interesting contrast to Fed 51 noted above).

***This is, of course, a counterfactual.  The main point being, however, that choices about institutional design do have long term consequences for the way a system works.  Further, the choices about design at the convention influenced subsequent choices.