Reflections on the Panama Canal

I made a trip to Panama City, Panama last week for a conference.  It was my first trip to the country and I did not really know what to expect of the city and its environs.  I was struck by was the remarkable number of high rises (many of them quite new) and the amazing amount of construction.   On the construction, I was further struck by the number of public works oriented projects (road, a metro, refurbishing of the colonial section, housing for the poor, new government buildings, etc.) that I have to wonder if Panama might not find itself in debt problems in the coming years.*

Punta Paitilla

Punta Paitilla in the background, with a construction project in the foreground.

However, what was really instructive to me was my visit to what was the Canal Zone and to the Canal itself.  As my colleague, Greg Weeks noted (both when we were at the Canal, but on his blog) , we have read about and taught the significance of the Canal and the Canal Zone for a long time, but there is something especially instructive about seeing the scale of it all.

Now, yes, the scale of the Canal is impressive, especially when one considers that it was constructed in the late 19th/early 20th centuries.  Indeed, the doors at the Miraflores Locks are the originals and have been in operation for 98 years.  The engineering of it all is remarkable as is the impact the Canal has had on world trade.

Miraflores locks

 

Canal

However, on the political/historical side of things, I was especially struck by the scale of the former Canal Zone, which used to be US territory until the turnover to the Panamanian government on December 31, 1999 as a result of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty signed in 1977.  It is one thing to read that the Canal Zone was a buffer zone created to allow the US to govern and maintain the Canal, it is another to see that at one point the are of the Zone near Panama City was a city unto itself on primo real estate that was granted to the United States via a treaty negotiated between the US and a French national only two weeks after Panama had gained independence from Colombia.  The Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which gave the US control of the Zone in perpetuity, was created via talks between Secretary of State John Hay and  Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, a Frenchman who had been directly involved in the French attempt at building a canal, and who had significant business interests in the process.  He was not negotiating in the interest of the Panamanians.  Really, the entire affair was imperialism, pure and simple, and any understanding of the events in Panama since its independence have to be understood in this context.

As such, when we try to understand events like the 1964 riots over the flying of a Panamanian flag, and the Johnson administration’s response thereto, the history (and the geography) have to be taken into consideration. (Of course, Johnson saw it all as left-wing agitation, not to mention with a great deal of arrogance, saying about the situation:  “I’m not going to be pushed around by a *** country no bigger than St. Louis”).**

Or, for that matter, when we try to understand why Carter negotiated the handover in the first place, and the context of the Ford-Reagan battle in 1976 on this issue.***

None of this is a new revelation in regards to nationalism in Panama (or elsewhere in Latin America, and around the world), but it was just something that was really brought home by seeing the actual context.

More generically, the entire tale is one that should remind us that it can be all too easy to ignore the way US actions affect local populations (and why local populations often harbor substantial, and well-founded, resentments against the United States—something that struck me this morning as I listened to a story about the US drone war in Waziristan).  One of the things that Americans (both politicians and everyday citizens) need to be better at is looking at our actions from the perspectives of those our actions directly effect.  It is all to easy to engage in the type of rhetoric that Reagan did in 1976 (“We dug it, we own it”) and get swept away in our own power-created self-righteousness.

One passing thought that strikes me as further fodder for thought in the current political climate:  the original attempt to build the Canal was a private venture, that eventually collapsed (as was the second attempt).  The third, successful, attempt was a government project.

All photos by me.  More here.

Posted at both OTB and PoliBlog.

*It is true that the country makes a remarkable amount of money from the Canal and the country has become a major banking center (to go along with a significant intake from tourism) but I still could not help but wonder if there was too much happening too quickly.  Still, that is an impression based in studying the region, but not an observation based on actual empirical evidence.

**As quoted on p. 163 Henry Raymont. 2005.  Troubled Neighbors:  The Story of US-Latin American Relations from FDR to the Present. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.

***In looking for a quote, I came across this piece from The American Conservative that discusses a Firing Line debate between Reagan and Buckley on this topic, which includes the following:

The Reagan-Buckley friendship en-dured two sharp fractures over foreign policy. The first has become legendary. In 1978, Buckley and Reagan, two paladins of the American Right, arrayed themselves on opposing sides of the Panama Canal treaties being negotiated by the Carter Administration. Buckley, who favored turning the canal over to the Panamanians, invited Reagan, opposed, to debate him on “Firing Line.” The knights had esquires: James Burnham, George Will, and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt stood with Buckley. Pat Buchanan, Roger Fontaine, and Admiral John McCain Jr., father of the senator, were with Reagan.

Back then, conservatives could disagree with one another about foreign policy openly and civilly. Reagan sounded notes familiar from recent debates over America’s role in the Mideast: “I think we would cloak weakness in the suit of virtue” if America were to surrender the canal, he warned. “With this treaty, what do we do to ourselves in the eyes of the world, and to our allies? Will they, as Mr. Buckley says, see that as the magnanimous gesture of a great and powerful nation? … I think the world would see it as, once again, Uncle Sam putting his tail between his legs and creeping away rather than face trouble.”

Buckley’s response would today get him branded an unpatriotic conservative. “We donegotiate under threats,” he told Reagan. “Ninety-nine percent of all the negotiations that have gone on from the beginning of this world have gone on as a result of threats. … The fact of the matter is that there are people in Panama who don’t accept the notion of Governor Reagan about the undisputed, unambiguous sovereignty that the United States exercises over that territory.” Likening Panamanian demands for sovereignty over the Canal Zone to the American Revolution, Buckley observed, “All of a sudden we find that we resent it when people say that they’re willing to fight for their freedom.”

Posted in Latin America, OTB | 1 Comment

FARC Ceasefire Deadline on the Horizon

Via the BBC:  Farc ceasefire ‘to end’ as peace talks resume in Cuba

Colombia’s Farc rebels have said their ceasefire will be suspended on 20 January, as initially planned.

The announcement came as peace talks between the rebels and the Colombian government resumed in the Cuban capital, Havana.

Both parties have hinted at speeding up the pace ahead of the unilateral Farc ceasefire deadline.

The talks aim to end five decades of an armed conflict that has killed an estimated 600,000 people in Colombia.

Some fear fresh Farc attacks in Colombia may hamper the negotiations.

But the rebels’ chief negotiator, Ivan Marquez, has ruled out an extension of the ceasefire.

“The unilateral ceasefire ends on January 20,” Marquez told AP news agency. “That’s it.”

The Colombian government and the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) have been in peace talks since October with the hope of finally ending the armed conflict between the guerrilla group and the state that has been ongoing since the early 1960s.  This is not the first time that there has been an attempt at a political settlement, but the first since the dramatic failure of the Pastrana administration (1998-2002).  The prospects for a peace deal strike me as real, if anything because the FARC has suffered a number of serious setbacks since 2007, including, but not limited to, the escape of some high profile prisoners, the successful rescue of the FARC’s prize captives (Ingrid Betancourt and three US contractors, the death by natural causes of the group’s leader and founder, and the death of numerous high level commanders at the hands of the Colombian armed forces.  In addition, and rather importantly, the FARC’s level of public support was, and remains, quite low.

It is important to understand that while the FARC’s ability to achieve its ideological goals of revolution in Colombia are impossible to achieve.  Revolution is, in a word, hard,* although the FARC has sufficient capacity to make serious trouble indefinitely that the Colombian state has a motivation to negotiate.  Further, if the situation could be managed via negotiation, it would bring closure to a significant and lengthy era in Colombian history.  It is worth further noting that there is a history of peace negotiations in Colombia that have lead to the demobilization of guerrilla organizations (and other violent actors, such as paramilitary groups), so the current talks with the FARC have to ne understood in that context.**

A major long-term obstacle is, of course, the fact that the FARC has been involved in the drug trade as a means of funding their revolution since the early 1980s, with some cells of the organization more heavily invested in the criminal enterprises of the group.  The cellular nature of the organization makes it possible, if not likely, that even if a peace agreement is reached that some of those cells will continue to operate.

As to the ceasefire issue noted above:  this is almost a negotiating tactic, as would be any violence perpetrated should the deadline pass.  The FARC clearly want to remind that government that they are present and remain a significant actor. 

It will be interesting to see how this plays out.  A real question to me is how a post-violence FARC would manifest as a political actor if the peace talks are successful.  There is some political space in Colombia for a political party to emerge from such talks, but such space would be small at the national level.***  I could see the a post-FARC party having significant cache in some localities in Colombia, especially in areas of the country where the FARC has operated as a quasi-government for some time.

*Even, I would note, when one is well armed.

**Two major groups, the M-19 (Movement of April the 19th) and the EPL (The People’s Liberation Army) both demobilized  in the early 1990s and became political parties, to name the two most prominent examples.

***In terms of the FARC’s goal, El Tiempo notes that they are seeking agrarian reform as part of the talks: Empezó debate por la reforma agraria que proponen las Farc.

Posted in Colombia, OTB | Leave a comment

First the Secret Service, Now the Honduran Embassy (More Tales of Colombia Prostitutes)

Via the BBC:  Honduras investigates Bogota embassy Christmas party

Honduras has said it is setting up a commission to investigate reports that a wild Christmas party was held at its embassy in the Colombian capital.

Reports suggest that two prostitutes attended the party, which began on the evening of 20 December and carried on until the next morning, Efe reports.

Computers and mobile phones were stolen and rooms in the embassy, north of Bogota, were ransacked.

Colombian police are looking for the sex workers who attended the party.

Apparently what happens in Colombia does not stay in Colombia.  Perhaps foreign visitors representing their governments ought to steer clear of the sex workers, yes?

(For those who need a refresher on the reference in the title:  Secret Service Agents Recalled from Colombia over Prostitution Allegations).

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Drug Ring Investigated within Colombian Armed Forces

Via Fox News Latino:  Colombia Army Probes Alleged Drug Trafficking Ring Within Its Ranks.

While one might assume cocaine, but the drug in question appears to be marijuana.

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PoliBlog: The Return

I have not posted anything new here (save the “Ugh” post this afternoon) since April.  While my main blogging will remain at OTB, I did not want to leave PoliBlog dormant any longer.  My goal is to relaunch as a more personal mix of things like Colombian politics, research, and photography.  We will see how it goes.

At a minimum, I wanted the site to be active as I approach my tenth blogiversary.

(And yes, I screwed up and messed up my archive).

Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment

Ugh

Things are all screwed up at the moment.  Whether they will ever be fixed again remains to be seen.

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