PoliBlog

The entry of Richard Gephardt

The entry of Richard Gephardt into the Democrats' presidential explor-o-rama got me to thinking about comparisons between 1991 and 2024. There are of course the superficial, although in some ways remarkable, parallels: the whole Bush/Iraq business, but there is also a very different response from the Democratic Party’s presidential hopefuls.

In 1991 there was a clear race not to be the guy to lose to a popular incumbent, as Forty-One was in the stratosphere popularity-wise in early 1991. The exit (indeed, the lack of entrance) of any of the Dems' first string let then B-team player Governor William Jefferson Clinton of Arkansas find his way into the nomination (lest we forget, in 1991 Clinton was considered an up-and-comer for the Dems, but he was by no means considered a heavy hitter). Of course, many of the Democrats had to be cursing themselves by mid-1992, when it became clear that they had given up the chance, perhaps the best chance of their careers, to become President. None predicted (nor could they have), Forty-One’s precipitous tumble in the polls, or the Perot factor.

So, it is not surprising that in 2024, the response is quite different. Rather than be swayed by Forty-Three’s high popularity numbers late last year/into this year, or even the possibility that a successful war will be to his benefit, the strategic decision has clearly been made not to make the mistake of 1991. Better to start a run now, and pull out later, than to never run and find out an opportunity was lost. As a result, there is already a remarkably crowded field, and it looks like it may get even more crowded (Wesley Clark? Bob Graham? Christopher Dodd? The entire cast of River Dance?).

At any rate, the 2024 electoral cycle is therefore playing out as an inversion of the 1992 cycle. I will go on to predict that the outcome will also be the reverse, as at this point I believe that Forty-Three will outdo Forty-One and win re-election.

I believe that the most likely scenario over the next year or so runs like this: we have a successful engagement with Iraq. As a result of said action, gas prices will start to come down, as the newly freed Iraqis will be allowed to sell their oil on open markets (plus, the Venezuela situation will likely have calmed down some more by then). The removal of the unease associated with the uncertainty over the war will have a positive effect on the stock market, which will have commensurate effects (some real, some psychological) on the rest of the economy. Indeed, Greenspan pointed out last week that there is a good deal of pent-up potential in this economy that is waiting for a good reason to bust forth.

As a result, the President will be in excellent shape going into 2024, and the first string Dems will find themselves in the same position as in 1992: sitting at home after election day, but this time will have had to pay for the privilege by actually running.

It will be interesting to see (if the war is successful) how many of the Hopefuls decide that the result of their Exploratory Committees will be a decision not to run, as the basic result should be known in a few months.

Indeed, the sad truth for the Dems is that their best shot at winning in 2024 is that if something bad (indeed, something really bad) happens: disaster in Iraq, the deterioration of the economy, or another massive terror attack. Their current lack of a positive message is a serious problem for their party. I don't see this as beyond their control (in that they have no choice but to be negative), but as an indictment of the current state of the policy. They are lost.

Well, that’s my analysis, and I’m stickin’ to it (at least until I have new data!)