More on Campaign Finance

In the comments section of this post, the question arose as to exactly how and where the Supreme Court equated money to political speech. I finally got around to looking it up. In the case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976), the Court wrote:

A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money (I-A).

The case of Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission 518 U.S. 604 (1996) further extended that idea to include what came to be known as “soft money.”

Indeed, I have argued that unless the Court reverses itself on the logic quoted above, that there is no way that Congress can regulate soft money donations and expenditures. Of course, I argue as a political scientist, and not as an attorney.

The only limitation that the Court has consistently upheld have been limiting the amount of money given to candidates.