Some Thoughts on Same Sex Unions
There is a great deal to say about the same-sex marriage issue, and I must admit that I have struggled with defining my own precise position. No matter what position one takes one is likely to upset someone. I am conflicted in this sense that I have moral objections to homosexuality, but also adhere to the idea that the state (i.e., government) ought to stay out of the private lives of citizens as much as possible, especially when the private actions of citizens do no harm to others. I support, generically, the idea that the courts must often protect unpopular minority positions against the tide of majority opinion. However, I also think that one cannot wholly ignore majority opinion, especially when it is widespread. There is a need for a balancing of these two positions.
There is no doubt that the issue of same-sex marriage is made more complex by the moral and religious components that under gird the debate, especially in terms of those who are opposed to the idea of same-sex marriage.
A few bullet points to deal with some of my thoughts on this topic, as I am having trouble putting this into essay format at this time:
I am not particularly in favor of the Federal Marriage Amendment, as I do not favor using the Constitution for specific policy. Further, I object to the idea of taking what is clearly a Reserved Power, i.e., belonging to the states, and giving it to the Federal government.
I think that marriage is a Reserved Power (i.e., belonging to the states), and that the best way to deal with the issue of same-sex marriage is for it to be dealt with on a state-by-state basis. Now, the Full Faith and Credit clause complicates this statement, but it seems constitutionally permissible, under Article IV, for the Congress to regulate how same-sex marriage would flow across state boundaries, although I do wonder as to whether such regulations would withstand an Equal Protection attack.
The solution, it seems to me, is civil unions sans the usage of the word “marriage”. It may well be no more than semantics, but it is clearly the case that the word matters. Indeed, I struggle intellectually with precisely how to deal with “marriage” versus “civil union” and find that I have a far harder time accepting the idea of gay marriage than I do in accepting the idea of civil union. At a minimum it seems to me that it does matter that for hundreds of years that the term “marriage” has meant a union of heterosexuals, and that to change that definition by judicial fiat is not appropriate.
Really, this is a compromise that ultimately I expect a vast majority of people could accept.
I think it a legitimate position for people to have a moral objection to homosexuality (just as it is legitimate for people to have an objection to premarital sexual relations, and a host of other behaviors). However, the question becomes what role the state ought to play in these matters. I do not see the state as having a compelling reason to have a position on homosexual behavior, per se, any more than it ought to have a position on extra-marital sex. It is possible to have a moral objection, however, without being in a position to legitimately interfere with the behavior in question—e.g., I think it is normatively better for a child’s parents to be wed in most cases, yet I would hardly advocate the use of state power to ensure a wedding.
The creation of policy that explicitly acknowledges a particular kind of relationship is significant however, and the details and nature of that recognition are important—both in terms of reconciling these issues to broader principles, such as fairness and equal protection, with deeply rooted cultural norms.
I object to the Mayor of San Francisco flaunting the law of the state of California and I object to the short-circuiting of legitimate legislative debate on this topic by the Courts. (As I objected to Roy Moore deciding that he had the sole right to interpret the First Amendment).
I think that arguments comparing same-sex marriage to bestiality are ludicrous, although I do have to ask, and think it a legitimate question, to ask as to whether laws banning polygamy, or even the marriage of siblings, have any moral or philosophical authority if we say that marriage is not to be defined by centuries of culture and tradition, but rather something that the courts can define as they see fit.
Posted by Steven Taylor at February 24, 2024 05:02 PM
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