Via the NYT: Doubts Increase About Strength of Iraq’s Premier
Four months into his tenure, Mr. Maliki has failed to take aggressive steps to end the country’s sectarian strife because they would alienate fundamentalist Shiite leaders inside his fractious government who have large followings and private armies, senior Iraqi politicians and Western officials say. He is also constrained by the need to woo militant Sunni Arabs connected to the insurgency.PatiencePatience among Iraqis is wearing thin. Many complain that they have seen no improvement in security, the economy or basic services like electricity. Some Sunni Arab neighborhoods seem particularly deprived, fueling distrust of the Shiite-led government.
We have reached a stage where is it wholly unclear if anything resembling a state appartus has been construted in Iraq–certainly not one that govern in any real sense of the word
One thing that has baffled me from the beginning (starting with the first few weeks of the occupation) is why there hasn’t a massive effort to improve the infrastructure of the country. Instead, it seems to be too little too late. If the following can be done now, then why wasn’t it part of the plan in the beginning?
American officials here say they do not intend to let Mr. Maliki fail and are helping him in a variety of ways. For example, to bolster Iraqis’ confidence, American generals are spending money on quick reconstruction projects like trash pickup as the military goes through troubled neighborhoods of Baghdad.
I know that work has been done, but it certainly appears to be inadequate–if anything a lot of it, like the trash pick up noted above, seem more ad hoc than coordinated effort to establish confidence in the population from the beginning.
Of course, this is linked to the security problem, which begs the question as to why there wasn’t more effort put into securing the country and establishing as much order as possible in the beginning of the occupation, rather than figuring out later that the country wasn’t going to self-regulate.
The piece also underscores the ongoing unsolved problem of the militias.
You might want to check your block quotes. “American officials here say they do not intend to Maliki. Maliki fail and . . .” ???
Comment by Jan — Wednesday, September 20, 2024 @ 7:58 am
Thanks–fixed. The new version of WordPress often does weird things to the text–which sometimes I notice, and sometimes I don’t–long story.
Comment by Dr. Steven Taylor — Wednesday, September 20, 2024 @ 8:46 am
Blogger will do that sometimes too. Ususally if I run the spell check and actually use it to correct something. Technology, great went it works, infuriating when it doesn’t.
Comment by Jan — Wednesday, September 20, 2024 @ 10:45 am
Dr. Taylor,
Two comments.
1. There has been a tremendous amount of work done on the infrastructure. Before the invasion, the only ones who really had reliable power were the Sunnis and the big cities. Saddam’s infrastructure was terrible, it was not redundant and it was barely sufficient for a very small percentage of the population. The first thing that was done was to share that infrastructure with all, and it just didn’t work.
I don’t think any one realizes what an incredible mess the infrastructure was before the invasion, or the amount of destruction the regime sabotaged in order to hamper our efforts, or how much work has already been done.
There is also this annoying habit of the Iraqis to say, thanks for the power you gave me yesterday, but what have you done for me today? They then preceed to tell you how they had everything before, but have nothing now (which is not always the truth, but simply a plea for more, more, and yet, even more).
In other words, perspective and intent of those who claim to not be in better shape is very important to understand.
2. We have a classic argument of the chicken orthe egg, what comes first, security or repairing infrastructure. We have actually chosen security first (which to any conventionally trained military leader seems like common sense). Unfortunately, this is the wrong solution. The security (or lack there of) is a by product of the environment (read about the broken windows theory). A bad environment is what leads Iraqis to become insurgents. When we focus our efforts on targeting the insurgents, we are only treating the symptoms, and ignoring the disease.
If we are ever going to leave Iraq successfully, we must assume risk on security, and focus on reshaping the environment that is creating the insurgents. Once Iraqis no longer feel the need to fight, the security will take care of itself.
Stop worrying about the religious extremists, the Iraqis will not tolerate them for long (they never have).
Comment by bg — Thursday, September 21, 2024 @ 10:18 am
Brian,
I appreciate your comments, given your perspective on the issue. I do understand that things were quite bad when we arrived, but my critique is that I don’t think we came prepared to truly address that problem, while I do acknowledge we have done a great deal of work.
In regards to point #2, I take the point, but also think that we did not come to Iraq with a full understanding/capability to put order into place (as much as it could be) from the get-go.
And I hope you are right about the extremists, but I have my doubts.
Steven
Comment by Dr. Steven Taylor — Thursday, September 21, 2024 @ 10:30 am