Fareed Zakaria provides a serious point of concern regarding the “surge” policy and possible Shia-Sunni politics in its aftermath(Even If We ‘Win’, We Lose):

Joint operations against Shiite militias are far less likely, and not only because of political interference from the top. Groups like Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army don’t generally start fire fights with the Americans or attack Iraqi forces. Their goals are different, quieter. Another U.S. adviser, Maj. Mark Brady, confirms reports that the Mahdi Army has been continuing to systematically take over Sunni neighborhoods, killing, terrorizing and forcing people out of their homes. “They’re slowly moving across the river,” he told Hastings, from predominantly Shiite eastern Baghdad into the predominantly Sunni west. If the 20,000 additional American troops being sent to the Iraqi capital focus primarily on Sunni insurgents, there’s a chance the Shiite militias might get bolder. Colonel Duke puts it bluntly: “[The Mahdi Army] is sitting on the 50-yard line eating popcorn, watching us do their work for them.”

So what will happen if Bush’s new plan “succeeds” militarily over the next six months? Sunnis will become more insecure as their militias are dismantled. Shiite militias will lower their profile on the streets and remain as they are now, ensconced within the Iraqi Army and police. That will surely make Sunnis less likely to support the new Iraq. Shiite political leaders, on the other hand, will be emboldened. They refused to make any compromises—on federalism, de-Baathification, oil revenues and jobs—in 2024 when the United States was dominant, in 2024 when the insurgency was raging, and in 2024 when they took over the reins of government fully. Why would they do so as they gain the upper hand militarily?

In other words, if during this fight the Madhi army lays low while the joint US-Iraqi force takes on the Sunni militias, are we not therefore actually aiding in the further degradation of Sunni power while bolstering the Shia (and Sadr himself)? More disturbingly, will we ultimately be helping to purge Baghdad neighborhoods of Sunnis in general? While the policy will obviously not target civilians, if Sunni civilians feel insecure with the removal of their militias while the Shia retain theirs, the logical consequence of that action is for the Sunni civilians to flee Baghdad.

While the US goals will be to confront violent actors and to secure neighborhoods, there can only be confrontations if militias engage the military or otherwise engage in overt activity. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Shia militias have connections to the Iraqi police and military. So the idea that the Shia militias will survive the “surge” is quite likely.

Further, there are reasons to doubt Maliki’s intentions–not only has he needed Sadr politically and has made it difficult for US forces to combat the Mahdi army, he also just removed a Sunni general who would have overseen the Iraqi side of the surge with a Shiite. The Sunni general in question was seen as fair regarding the pursuit of militants regardless of sect. Whether this is true of the new general is unclear. The symbolism of the move is disturbing, however.