Votes are being counted in Turkey after a general election being seen as a crucial test of its secular tradition.
[…]
Some 42 million people were eligible to vote in the poll, while 14 parties are vying for seats in the 550-member parliament.
Voting, which was compulsory, started at 0700 (0400 GMT) in eastern Turkey, and polls opened an hour later in the rest of the country.
All election banners, slogans and party flags were taken down on Saturday night, in accordance with Turkey’s electoral law.
Polling stations closed at 1700 local time (1400 GMT).
And now we wait for the results and the reactions.
What will happen if the AKP (which is a religious-based, Islamic party) retains its majority? What if that majority exceeds the 2/3rd needed to elect the President without interference from the other parties (the issue which led to these early elections in the first place)? How will the pro-secularists react? And, perhaps most important of all, how will the military react?
This also could end up being a case study wherein the the electoral rules do a poor job of reflecting the actual will of the voters in the context of a contentious election that results in a crisis. For details on the problems with Turkey’s electoral system, see here.
It still has a large majority in parliament, though not enough to elect a president. However, it looks like it can win a national presidential election. The referendum on amending the constitution to allow such an election will be in October, and I suppose the first direct presidential election could be by the end of the year.
The AKP appears to have played the recent crisis masterfully.
I will not attempt to explain my disappointment with the results. May be I am too secular, I do not know.
The Link is a spatial illustration of the election results by BBC. What strike me was not AKP’s performance. Please look at the votes in South East Turkey. Go along the provinces that borders with Iraq, Iran, Syria, and than go up to north. You will see it is either AKP or BAG (BAG as in BAGIMSIZ, meaning Independent, meaning Kurdish!.
Serhat.
Comment by serhat — Monday, July 23, 2025 @ 10:04 am
[…] Votes Being Counted in Turkey (and We Wait for the Next Act). […]
Plans to form a single political party in Venezuela have taken a step forward with the first activists’ meetings.
Six million people have signed up to become members of the President’s United Socialist Party.
Critics worry about the threat to plurality, but organisers say it will give ordinary Venezuelans more chance to shape the future of the country.
Venezuela’s parliament, the National Assembly, is made up purely of politicians who support the president.
But they come from a number of different parties.
Hugo Chavez is changing that by creating one united party, which he says will be constructed from the bottom up.
Of course, in regards to that last sentence, that’s what they all say. The Soviet government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union both had bottom-up organizations on paper, where power was supposed to flow upwards from the people to the pinnacle of the state/party, but in reality all the lower levels did was rubber-stamp whatever the next higher level presented to them, all the way to the top of the Party–which was where the real power was.
Now, I am not asserting that Chávez is creating a Soviet-style regime, but I am saying that I don’t buy the statement that this is simply a way to govern from the “bottom up.” Like all of Chávez’s recent moves, this is about consolidating power around himself (whether it is expanding decree authority or attempts to curtail free expression).
I will say this: the first paragraph asserts that this is a move to create a single party in Venezuela, but the text makes it sound like it is an attempt to unite all the pro-Chávezistas into a single party. While the latter is still a clear power-consolidation move, it is not the exact same thing as the former, as one presumes that opposition parties, anemic as they may be, will be allowed to function. The model here is probably more the PRI in Mexico in its heyday (without, I would wager, regular executive rotation) than the CPSU.
There is also a clear whiff of authoritarianism in the air when people in power start organizing their citizen supporters using military terminology:
Six million people have volunteered to become activists.
They have been formed into battalions. More than 1,000 of these have now met for the first time.
They will choose representatives who will soon take part in a national congress which will decide how the party will work.
[…]
Mr Chavez says the battalions will be centres of debate which will drive the socialist revolution.
I know that many see Chávez as some sort of hope for the poor in Venezuela, but he continues to appear to me to be self-serving and power-seeking, and history shows that those types of leaders don’t end up serving the public good in the end, even if they use public services as a means of accruing and consolidating power.
The opposition parties has not been prohibited, yet. Chavez moves are always very slow and you have to wait for months until you see the next mood, in that way he prevents many attacks and keep his fame as the poor savior. However, the rest of the parties that supported Chavez but had an identity and a separate history as a political party from the others are now bound to choose if they wanna keep as political organizations and Chavez supporters and then, join the PSUV (therefore, die as the party itself) or if they wanna be now against the president (and of course that will mean political death aswell.) Not because Chavez is not creating from one day to another an only party Soviet style system, doesn’t mean that his moves are not authoritarian. He’s been ruling the country non stop since 1998 and when someone rules for that long, he get used to have power and the rest to obey..
PS: I’m venezuelan and my english is very poor, so excuses about the grammar and spelling mistakes you might find on the lines above.
Actually, I would not use the PRI analogy, and in some respects the CPSU analogy is closer. The original organizations that Chavez created while still in the army were pretty clearly Leninist inspired.
The PRI, on the other hand, was created out of a mix of regional elites that had emerged from the revolution (and also some pre-revolutionary regional elites). It was thus much more bottom-up from the beginning, and while it grew more centralized over time, I would argue (and am doing so in the intro to the much-delayed edited volume on Mexico) that even at the height of its hegemony it remained more a “federation” of regional elites than the monolithic centralized machine it was often portrayed as being.
I think Julia is right about the dilemma faced by the various separate parties that backed Chavez. In this sense, we might even say that a closer parallel is the “salami tactics” used by the Eastern European Communists to get rid of their immediate post-war “popular front” allies.
Still, while Chavez is certainly not a Communist, I do think his tactics draw more from that playbook than from the Mexican. (So did those of his mentor, Fidel, of course, but like the PRI, Cuba’s Communist Party originated from a genuine popular revolution; there is no such parallel in Venezuela.)
A very fair point, and I should clarify my position. I was speaking in terms of ideology as much as I was the mode of governance: the CPSU forbade other parties and was more important than the formal institutions of the state. The PRI, however, at least let other parties exist, even if they weren’t allowed to win anything (or, at least not much–plus it depends on which era of the PRI’s rule we are talking about).
I could see Chavez forming a main, dominant party that controlled the state, but that still allowed a few token parties to exist.
Also, I was trying to quell the knee-jerk reaction some will have that “single party” = “Communists!!”
Further, I am unconvinced (although I may be wrong here) that Chavez does not have a central ideology guiding this party, which again is more like the PRI (whose ideology was malleable over time) than the CPSU.
There is probably a better analog, however, than the PRI–I will have to give it some thought.
Maybe the early Peronists?
Comment by Dr. Steven Taylor — Sunday, July 22, 2025 @ 2:08 pm
Yes, I often refer to Chavismo as being this generation’s equivalent of earlier Peronism. Of course, all analogies are useful only up to a point.
As for Soviet Communism, well, it was at least as much about a strategy for holding and maintaining total state power as it was about ideology, but obviously Chavez is unlikely ever to have (or seek) the full control over the economy that Soviet and Cuban Communists attained.
Most are just silly and rank up their with the utterances of Pat Robertson (for some examples, see here, here, here and here–not a comprehensive list, btw).
I was doing a little writing this morning and was looking up a factoid about the Colombian former guerrilla group the M-19 that led to a reference to an Ecuadoran guerrilla group that I hadn’t thought about in years, but that is clearly the very best name for a guerrilla group ever.
When spoken aloud in Spanish with the appropriate gusto, it has quite the visceral sound that is perfect for a guerrilla organization. In English it is simply freakin’ funny.
For those who care about actual details, the group is no longer active, and many of its members moved into non-violent politics as the result of a national dialog in 1991. Based on the one reference work at my immediate disposal it is unclear if the group continued to use the name in the electoral realm or was absorbed by another, existing, party.
The name is a reference to an Ecuadoran general/President (Eloy Alfaro) who was assassinated in the early Twentieth Century. Why it would be of symbolic importance that he lives, or why his named should be associated with an explicative is unclear based on my limited knowledge of the subject.
Hadn’t thought about it in a while, eh? That’s only because we haven’t reminisced about those days in some time, no?
It is a name that is hard to beat, for sure.
The Nohlen volume (Elections in the Americas, vol. 2, Oxford 2025) does not show any electoral party ever using that name. So, I guess Alfaro está muerto, carajao!
Political campaigning has ended in Turkey ahead of Sunday’s general election, seen as one of the most important in the nation’s history.
The early poll was called after MPs from secular parties and the ruling AK Party reached deadlock, after failing to agree on a candidate for president.
The government has been focusing its campaign on its economic record.
The opposition accuses the Islamic-based AK Party of threatening Turkey’s secular system.
Tomorrow will be most interesting and the results will have important implications for Turkish politics.
Some background can be found here, here and here. See also Matthew Shugart’s multiple posts on the issue.
Yesterday the President issued an Executive Order that defines what the CIA cannot do in regards to interrogations of prisoners believed to have information on terrorism (or, I suppose, anything else). Specifically the administration is attempting to address issues raised by the Supreme Court (via the AP):
The executive order is the White House’s first public effort to reach into the CIA’s five-year-old terror detention program, which has been in limbo since a Supreme Court decision last year called its legal foundation into question.
Several thoughts come to mind. First, as WaPo and the NYT, note this morning, the EO allows the program to resume (it has supposedly been on hold) and the guidelines in question are rather broad and vague. Still, as the NYT notes, it would seem that these rules do scale back what the CIA is allowed to do:
Several officials said the permitted techniques did not include some of the most controversial past techniques, among them “waterboarding,” which induces a feeling of drowning, and exposure to extremes of heat and cold.
I must confess as to having a hard time taking this all that seriously. For one, I concur with the following (via the WaPo story):
“All the order really does is to have the president say, ‘Everything in that other document that I’m not showing you is legal — trust me,’ ” said Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch.
That is standard operating procedure for the administration–they are big on the “trust me” mode of argumentation. And really, I have to say that I agree with Jeralyn Merritt:
This has all the earmarks of an order designed to continue rather than limit CIA abusive interrogation techniques.
However, beyond that, when the President does things like he did yesterday, i.e., basically say that he will not allow the DoJ to prosecute specific laws that he doesn’t like (at least if they challenge his executive prerogatives) or given his usage of signing statements, which basically say he will ignore the parts of the law he doesn’t like, how can we take seriously that the President will necessarily follow his own guidelines?
The Palmetto Scoop has the latest and Rudy leads the GOP pack and Hillary the Democratic.
Interestingly, McCain is second in the Republican field, suggesting he may not be quite dead yet. Romney appears quite toast-like in terms of SC at the moment.
I’ve thought for a long time that Mayor Giulliani would be a stronger candidate against Sens. Clinton or Obama in a national election. I think his 9/11 hero image coupled with a history of social liberalism would do him well. PLUS - having not been in the Senate, he can speak about Iraq in abstract without having to answer for a voting record.
HOWEVER - I’ve never thought he would be able to secure the Republican nomination, and never thought he would have much of a chance in the bible belt. The late Rev. Falwell was very critical of Rudy, going as far as to counsel his followers not to vote at all if an election came down to Giulliani and Clinton. I’m not familiar with other key religious conservative leaders and their stance on Rudy, but my guess would be that it would be similar.
That he is carrying a hefty margin in SC flies in the face of my logic. I’m not sure what to think about it.
Comment by Captain D. — Saturday, July 21, 2025 @ 4:16 pm
Bush administration officials unveiled a bold new assertion of executive authority yesterday in the dispute over the firing of nine U.S. attorneys, saying that the Justice Department will never be allowed to pursue contempt charges initiated by Congress against White House officials once the president has invoked executive privilege.
The position presents serious legal and political obstacles for congressional Democrats, who have begun laying the groundwork for contempt proceedings against current and former White House officials in order to pry loose information about the dismissals.
Under federal law, a statutory contempt citation by the House or Senate must be submitted to the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, “whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.”
But administration officials argued yesterday that Congress has no power to force a U.S. attorney to pursue contempt charges in cases, such as the prosecutor firings, in which the president has declared that testimony or documents are protected from release by executive privilege.
Sorry, but it is the job of the Justice Department to pursue execution of the laws passed by Congress, not to ignore laws because the President doesn’t like them. Indeed, the underlying logic here is that the Congress can’t investigate the executive branch if the President has decided that he doesn’t want them to do so–so much for checks and balances and oversight (although ultimately the logical conclusion of the administration’s position here is that the only real c&b power that the Congress has is impeachment, as they can do that by themselves).
According to the piece, the Reagan administration once asserted the same position, which involved an EPA official named Burford. The case ended up in court, and Congress eventually got what it wanted:
In the Burford case, which involved spending on the Superfund program, the White House filed a federal lawsuit to block Congress’s contempt action. The conflict subsided when Burford turned over documents to Congress.
The article points out that the Reagan Administration made the same kind of argument in 1984, when EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford was cited for contempt by the House, but before it got to court, Burford turned over documents. In fact, that is how these standoffs over executive privilege have generally turned out in the past–with a deal. Neither side appears interested in one this time.
One wonders. Jacob Sullum at Reason Hit and Run thinks a deal will take place:
I’ll go out on a limb and predict that the current confrontation, like the one with Gorsuch and every other showdown over documents reviewed by the CRS report, will be resolved without any actual prosecutions for contempt. After some more posturing, the administration will give Congress the information it wants while insisting it really doesn’t have to.
I will confess, that while a deal may happen, I am more inclined to think that the administration will stonewall and try and run out the clock rather than have to submit to the Congress.
All of this (the current case and the Burford case) is part of the “unitary executive” theory that this administration holds to rather tightly (back to WaPo):
David B. Rifkin, who worked in the Justice Department and White House counsel’s office under presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, praised the position and said it is consistent with the idea of a “unitary executive.” In practical terms, he said, “U.S. attorneys are emanations of a president’s will.” And in constitutional terms, he said, “the president has decided, by virtue of invoking executive privilege, that is the correct policy for the entire executive branch.”
However, I have to agree with the following:
But Stanley Brand, who was the Democratic House counsel during the Burford case, said the administration’s legal view “turns the constitutional enforcement process on its head. They are saying they will always place a claim of presidential privilege without any judicial determination above a congressional demand for evidence — without any basis in law.” Brand said the position is essentially telling Congress: “Because we control the enforcement process, we are going to thumb our nose at you.”
Certainly when the President believes that the Justice Department is a portion of his overall executive authority, then that is where you end up.
I further concur with this:
Rozell, the George Mason professor and authority on executive privilege, said the administration’s stance “is almost Nixonian in its scope and breadth of interpreting its power. Congress has no recourse at all, in the president’s view. . . . It’s allowing the executive to define the scope and limits of its own powers.”
I predict that this administration’s behavior will result in a seriously renewed call for a Justice Department that is more independent of political control than is currently the case, as it is clear that an executive who believes that all of the power of the branch flows from him personally cannot be fully trusted to directly control federal law enforcement, because said executive will assert the right to selectively enforce the laws. I am not sure what I think about such a move, but it certainly has tempting elements.
In regards to the specific issue on the table, and as I have pondered out loud on numerous occasions over this US Attorney firings business, if there is nothing to the story, why does the White House continually raise the stakes over the issue of simply providing an explanation? I know a lot of my readers think that this is all about a partisan witch hunt, but to me it is about providing an adequate explanation to the American public as to the behaviors of the Bush Justice Department. The executive branch works for us, and I would like the Bush administration to acknowledge that fact, but I fear no such acknowledgment will be forthcoming.
Also, to date it isn’t as if testimony before Congress on this issue has been hideously damaging to the administration. Mostly it has raised more questions than answers, but all of these gyrations make it look like the administration has something rather significant to hide. Yet, the administration and its defenders continue to argue that this is a nothing story.
I still maintain that it is ironic, and quite galling, that this administration in some of its anti-terrorism policies believes that it has the right to information on innocent citizens and takes the attitude that “if you aren’t doing anything wrong, you don’t have anything to worry about” yet asserts extreme privacy rights for itself.
although ultimately the logical conclusion of the administration’s position here is that the only real c&b power that the Congress has is impeachment, as they can do that by themselves
Congress could always go with the power of the purse and defund the Justice Department. Or how about defunding any White House lawyer that made this excessive argument?
As for making the Justice Department more independent I think the simplest answer is making that part of the criteria voters use when choosing a candidate. Making Justice more independent, whatever that means, brings up a fear of an entire agency behaving like special prosecutors. They could become a quasi-branch of the government (with no Dick Cheney defending it).
Perhaps–but on the other hand, the Fed is politically independent of the WH, and it does not seem prone to rogue behavior.
The comparison to special prosecutors isn’t entirely apt, as those are always appointed (or, at least, typically appointed) in the context of a specific politically-charged issue.
Comment by Dr. Steven Taylor — Friday, July 20, 2025 @ 10:42 am
A deal in this situation seems unlikely to me; it implies some compromise on both ends. The administration will dig in its heels.
The administration did offer a deal in the USA flap, a compromise, offering to have some of its officials testify off the record. It wasn’t good enough.
I say none of that to excuse the behavior, but just to highlight that I think both sides have learned their lesson about making deals.
Comment by Captain D. — Friday, July 20, 2025 @ 10:48 am
[…] “Bush to Congress: The DoJ Only Has to Prosecute the Laws that I Like (Executive Privilege Edition)” […]
Bush should be commended for this principled stand.
The type of public transparency that might be forthcoming with executive branch officials testifying to Congress would hurt the country, be antithetical to democracy, and embolden the terrorists.
Congress is nothing more than a mouthpiece for Al Quaeda. Any information provided to them will wind up in the hands of the enemy.
Comment by Ratoe — Friday, July 20, 2025 @ 1:56 pm
The idea of executive privilege does not appear in the Constitution, although (IIRC), even Washington relied on the concept. But in the end, the President doesn’t have a strong legal foundation for his argument.
OTOH, who wrote the law requiring that a lawyer from the executive branch prosecute cases that the legislature wants prosecuted? The legislature has a few lawyers of its own. Some of those lawyers were even involved in fighting the FBI investigation of a certain Louisiana congressman. Using those lawyers makes the most sense to me. And Congress can potentially re-write the law so that it can use those lawyers.
Comment by Max Lybbert — Friday, July 20, 2025 @ 3:48 pm
[…] like, how can we take seriously that the President will necessarily follow his own guidelines? Sphere: Related Content Filed under: US Politics, War on Terror || […]
Marc Lynch (aka Abu Aardvark), a political scientist who specializes in the Middle East, has a very interesting post that all who are convinced that The Surge fixed Anbar and Diyala and made the Sunni love Uncle Sam needs to read: : Sunni insurgency: Out of the shadows.
The money quotes:
These are the same groups about which I’ve often written (the Guardian names Iraqi Hamas, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the new Ansar al-Sunna, Jaish al-Islami, Jaish al-Mujahideen, Jama’ and Jaish al-Rashideen), coming together around the same political agenda: distaste for al-Qaeda, but armed resistance as long as the United States keeps forces in Iraq and a demand for reshaping the Iraqi political system to better represent Sunni interests. These [Sunni insurgent] leaders also say that it is their belief that the US will soon withdraw its forces, and not the strength of the American ’surge’, which has prompted their decision to step forward into the public political realm (”it is a common view in the resistance that [the US] will start to withdraw within a year…. Right or wrong, that is one of the factors that has led to the decision to form the new front, which is planned to be called the Political Office for the Iraqi Resistance.”)
These moves by the major insurgency factions over the last several months don’t fit well within the preferred American narrative. Their actions are not motivated by the ’surge’, but rather by the belief that the US will soon leave. Their hostility to the Islamic State of Iraq/al-Qaeda does not translate into support for the United States or the current Iraqi government.
One needs to read the entire piece.
Of the pro-Surge arguments that I have read, I have never seen any evidence that the Sunni have befriended the United States, turned on al Qaeda yes, but that doesn’t mean that they have become our pals. It is dreadfully important that we have a realistic assessment of the politics on the ground if the proper direction is to be pursued. Nonetheless:
hese factions have been articulating these positions very clearly and consistently for several months now. But they repeatedly seem to be marginalized or discounted because they don’t fit the American narrative, in which al-Qaeda is the primary enemy and most Sunnis and insurgency groups are switching to the American side. I really hope that American officials don’t really believe their own propaganda and are paying attention to the really significant developments on the Sunni side - because if not, then the political resolution which everyone seems to agree is needed will never be achieved.
One would hope, but one does not get the sense that this administration is prone to such behavior. They tend to like to see the world they want to see, not the world that they are actually having to deal with (and hence, the mess).
Mr. Lynch’s assessment is validated by what my friends on the ground have been telling me lately.
A couple of weeks ago I spoke with a friend who recently returned from Iraq. His unit had detained some insurgents who turned out to be Sunni. When asked why they were doing what they had been doing (can’t go into more detail than that), they explained that they knew the US would be leaving soon and it was important for them to demostrate their willingness to take their share of Iraq. Actually came out and said it like that.
The insurgency, I think, has shifted and the US is not the sole target these days - but it is still a target.
Comment by Captain D. — Friday, July 20, 2025 @ 11:03 am
Interesting–thanks for the info.
Comment by Dr. Steven Taylor — Friday, July 20, 2025 @ 11:15 am
The AKP made a big gain in votes (more than ten percentage points) but lost seats, compared to 2025.
It still has a large majority in parliament, though not enough to elect a president. However, it looks like it can win a national presidential election. The referendum on amending the constitution to allow such an election will be in October, and I suppose the first direct presidential election could be by the end of the year.
The AKP appears to have played the recent crisis masterfully.
Comment by MSS — Sunday, July 22, 2025 @ 2:52 pm
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/indepth/story/2007/07/070719_election_results_en.shtml
Dr. Taylor,
I will not attempt to explain my disappointment with the results. May be I am too secular, I do not know.
The Link is a spatial illustration of the election results by BBC. What strike me was not AKP’s performance. Please look at the votes in South East Turkey. Go along the provinces that borders with Iraq, Iran, Syria, and than go up to north. You will see it is either AKP or BAG (BAG as in BAGIMSIZ, meaning Independent, meaning Kurdish!.
Serhat.
Comment by serhat — Monday, July 23, 2025 @ 10:04 am
[…] Votes Being Counted in Turkey (and We Wait for the Next Act). […]
Pingback by Political Mavens » The Elections in Turkey — Monday, July 23, 2025 @ 11:26 am