Via WaPo: As British Leave, Basra Deteriorates
As British forces pull back from Basra in southern Iraq, Shiite militias there have escalated a violent battle against each other for political supremacy and control over oil resources, deepening concerns among some U.S. officials in Baghdad that elements of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated national government will turn on one another once U.S. troops begin to draw down.
Three major Shiite political groups are locked in a bloody conflict that has left the city in the hands of militias and criminal gangs, whose control extends to municipal offices and neighborhood streets. The city is plagued by “the systematic misuse of official institutions, political assassinations, tribal vendettas, neighborhood vigilantism and enforcement of social mores, together with the rise of criminal mafias that increasingly intermingle with political actors,” a recent report by the International Crisis Group said.
This type of scenario is why I have long harped on the lack of a functional state in Iraq and why I do not think that the progress in Anbar, etc. is as impressive as some make it out to be. Basra and its environs have long been said to be an example of good Iraq. However, if that region is going to degenerate into internecine fighting amongst Shiites over power and economic resources, what is going to happen in Baghdad and the Sunni triangle when troops leave?
The problem being underscored here is that there is no functional state to make and enforce the basic rules of society, and where there are institutions in place they are oriented not towards public service, but are allied with specific factions.
And it isn’t just me being pessimistic:
“it’s hard now to paint Basra as a success story,” said a senior U.S. official in Baghdad with long experience in the south. Instead, it has become a different model, one that U.S. officials with experience in the region are concerned will be replicated throughout the Iraqi Shiite homeland from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. A recent series of war games commissioned by the Pentagon also warned of civil war among Shiites after a reduction in U.S. forces.
For the past four years, the administration’s narrative of the Iraq war has centered on al-Qaeda, Iran and the sectarian violence they have promoted. But in the homogenous south — where there are virtually no U.S. troops or al-Qaeda fighters, few Sunnis, and by most accounts limited influence by Iran — Shiite militias fight one another as well as British troops. A British strategy launched last fall to reclaim Basra neighborhoods from violent actors — similar to the current U.S. strategy in Baghdad — brought no lasting success.
“The British have basically been defeated in the south,” a senior U.S. intelligence official said recently in Baghdad. They are abandoning their former headquarters at Basra Palace, where a recent official visitor from London described them as “surrounded like cowboys and Indians” by militia fighters.
These types of situations, along with missing weapons, humanitarian issues, questions about the inability of the Iraqis to take over expensive infrastructural projects, the difficulties in getting the central government to function even minimally, among other problems are why I can’t take the Bill Kristol’s of the world seriously. It is also why I can’t take the rosy projections of the administration seriously, with its vague and vacuous talk of “victory.” Unless a realistic assessment is made of the situation, something that the administration has never had, it is impossible to make appropriate policy choices going forward.
August 7th, 2024 at 8:38 am
[...] Original post by Dr. Steven Taylor [...]
August 8th, 2024 at 2:58 pm
[...] [cross-posted from PoliBlog]: [...]