The main problem, it would seem, with a lot of people’s assessment of the Honduran situation is that they insist on boiling down the whole thing (and, indeed, much of what happens in Latin America) to Hugo Chávez. Zelaya was an ally of Chávez? Well, then, do what you have to do!

A good example of this can be found in a piece in today’s WSJ by Mary Anastasia O’Grady: Honduras Defends Its Democracy which starts with the following sentence: “Hugo Chávez’s coalition-building efforts suffered a setback yesterday when the Honduran military sent its president packing for abusing the nation’s constitution.”

What if Chávez was an enemy of Zelaya’s? Or if he had been utterly uninvolved? Why is Chávez even relevant to determining whether or not the actions of the Honduran Supreme Court and military acted properly?

I understand: a lot of people in the US don’t like Hugo Chávez. I, myself, think that he is a detriment to the long-term democratic health of Venezuela, but I am continually amazed at the importance many ascribe to him. He talks a good game and has managed to obtain a modicum of influence in the region. However is not the hegemonic enemy who threatens US interests in the region that so many seem to think that he is. And even if he is, that doesn’t justify coups to oust someone because they are pro-Chávez.

O’Grady’s concludes as follows:

The struggle against chavismo has never been about left-right politics. It is about defending the independence of institutions that keep presidents from becoming dictators. This crisis clearly delineates the problem. In failing to come to the aid of checks and balances, Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Insulza expose their true colors.

First, it should be noted that by this definition of chavismo, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe is a consummate chavista, as he has already managed to get the constitution amended once to allow re-election, and is poised to repeat the feat. Of course, given the antagonism between Uribe and Chávez, I expect both men would find it amusing/annoying to consider Uribe a chavista (not to mention other examples of presidents who managed extra terms and who had no connection whatsoever to Hugo Chávez–I am looking at you Carlos Menem).

Second, to argue that critiques of the coup are failures to “come to the aid of checks and balances” is a remarkable statement given that there is no constitutional authority given to the Supreme Court of Justice to order the pre-dawn arrest and exile of a sitting president.

Let’s stop and think about this for a moment: why in the wee hours of the morning? If this was a normal process, why not show up at a more civilized hour and calmly tell the president that he is being exiled, and would he please come along–after all, it is legal and all that. Actions aren’t relegated to pre-dawn because they are orderly and normal.

Third, and this is in some ways the issue that bothers me the most by those (such as here, here and here) who see this move as the salvation of democracy: what about due process and rule of law? Yes, Zelaya was engaged in illegal actions, so find a legally appropriate way of dealing with it. Summary judgment and immediate exile aren’t exactly the hallmarks of democratic governance (petty criminals get more process than that). It seems that most of the defenders of the coup (or those who wish to dismiss the notion that it was a coup) assume that arrest and exile was not only legal, but it was basically the only option available.

It is possible, by the way, to believe that Zelaya was acting illegally and recklessly vis-à-vis his plebiscite idea and that the move against him was an unconstitutional coup that had nothing to do with democratic governance.