I am not an expert on Iranian politics (although I know more about the case than I do about many other cases). However, I know a decent amount about regime change (as an academic study, not just as the buzz words that the phrase has become). As such, I would note the following in terms of what to watch and think about in regards to the unfolding events in Iran and the coverage by US media.
In no particular order:
1. As dramatic and important a series of events that the street protests are, they will not be the means by which the final chapter of this story be written. There is a great amount of power to be associated with massive protests, but these manifestations of political passion always look larger vis-á-vis the broader population than they actually are. Beyond that, the real question will be the institutional cohesion of the state. Will the security apparatus side with the state or the crowds? Will those forces fracture? Ultimately the issues is going to be the state itself and whether the elite truly fractures and, more importantly, if pro-change factions have independent power resources or not.
The fact that prominent members of elite political families have been arrested indicates a growing division at the elite level and a ratcheting up of repression by the status quo powers (via the NYT): Relatives of Former Iranian President Are Arrested
As scattered protests and violence continued to grip Iran’s capital on Sunday, the government briefly detained relatives of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who heads two influential councils, worsening a deep rift among the nation’s top clerics.Mr. Rafsanjani, one of the fathers of the Iranian revolution, has been locked in a power struggle with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and worked closely with the reform movement during the disputed presidential election. Sunday morning, state television said five members of his family had been detained, including Mr. Rafsanjani’s daughter, Faezeh Hashemi. Later, family members said all had been released.
2. Along these lines, a key question will be if the state’s response to the protests is repression (and how severe over time) or some attempt at capitulation to quell the passions of the public. If, for example, certain segments of the population can either be scared or placated from taking the streets, it will be easier for the state to reassert control. At the moment repression is the route and the security forces appear to be following orders. However, the repression has not yet been as massive as it could be (see: Tiananmen Square 1989, Iraq 1991 or various events in Eastern Europe during the Cold War).
3. A key thing to keep in mind, and this has been noted but not enough in the mainstream coverage IMHO: Mousavi and his allies are not insurgent, counter-state actors who represent some new group of Iranian politicos, but rather pro-Revolution (the one from ‘79) actors who have been prominent members of the Iranian state. As noted above, Rafsanjani was a President of Iran and Mousavi was Prime Minister, amongst other things. As such, this is a case of intra-elite conflict–a not unimportant fact. As such, I would echo Peter Beaumont’s point in the Guardian: The urge to split the world into two warring camps is childish. This is not a simplistic case of an authoritarian state v. a democratic, out-of-power, opposition movement. And yet, I have seen it cast that way in coverage.
The simple bottom line: the real thing to watch is the elite-level interaction and what it says about who controls the state and what they can do with it. The street protests are just one aspect of the overall evolution of the situation and are as much a gauge of what is going on out of sight as they are anything else (i.e., what kind of support does the opposition have and what kind of control does the state retain). Also it should always be noted that when massive protests are involved, one cannot assume that all protesters share the same rationales and motivations for participating. It is certainly a mistake to turn this into a theocracy v. western democracy contest, as it is far more complex than that.
Sphere: Related Content
June 21st, 2024 at 3:48 pm
[...] the general theme of this post of mine from earlier today, I would recommend this one from Matthew Shugart, which includes the following key paragraph: Now, [...]
June 21st, 2024 at 6:07 pm
On the whole intra-elite angle, it is worth adding to your excellent points* that Rafsanjani is currently the head of the Assembly of Experts, an elected body of clerics that has the constitutional right to “supervise” the Supreme Leader. Supposedly, it also has the right to remove one from power, though this has never happened (at least not yet). So this could be pretty serious intra-elite (and inter-institutional) conflict. Also, one report I saw said that some experts (not the capitalized variety) believe Rafsanjani, who is quite wealthy**, may be helping the mass protests with financial and other resources.
___
* Clearly, you learned a lot about regime change, but I can’t figure out where.
** And, like many an insider to many a regime, was not always that way…
June 21st, 2024 at 6:41 pm
Clearly, you learned a lot about regime change, but I can’t figure out where.
It is hard to recall. You know, decades pass and the mind gets a bit soft.
But yes: clearly those who think that this is some kind of outsiders versus the state conflict haven’t a clue as to what they are looking at. Your point about Rafsanjani and inter-institutional conflict is well taken.
June 22nd, 2024 at 10:28 am
[...] noting that the drama of the street protests is not ultimately where the endgame will be located. A comment to one of my posts yesterday from Matthew Shugart amplified this point by noting that the [...]
June 23rd, 2024 at 12:21 pm
[...] mob, armed or otherwise. Indeed, in the context of Iran this is why I have tried to emphasize the intra-elite (and inter-institutional) conflicts in that case. Street protests alone are never [...]