On MTP this morning it was an ex-General-o-rama.

Here are some observations.

The first is that McCaffery, who has been a critic of the war and the administration, was more positive than I expected. Indeed, three of the four were generally (ha!) optimistic, although all were also quite critical (and rightly so).

The second is that Wes Clark’s foray in politics, and his clear long-terms aspirations, make we wonder about his biases in is critiques.

His call, which is nothing new, for “regional dialogue� continues not to make sense to me. Precisely how, I have to wonder, will talking to the Syrian, Iranian, Kuwaiti, and Saudi governments result in some sort of solution to the internal political issues in Iraq?

It would be nice if the Syrians would shut down their border to terrorists and yes, I would like the Iranians not to meddle, but it is wholly unclear how any of these states are going to help build democratic institutions in Iraq—or, indeed, that they would see it in their interests to do so.

I honestly have no problem with ratcheting up the diplomatic effort in the region, but I have never really understood what Clark really thinks his version of this idea will accomplish :

with regard to diplomacy, I’ve talked to members on the NSC staff. I know they’re not doing the diplomacy. Going to the Iranians and asking them not to help their side is not the kind of contact I’m talking about. I’m talking about having something like a contact group which we set up in the Balkans at the diplomatic level, at the representational level, in public where you can get nations’ interests out on the table, where you can talk about regional issues, including trade and travel, you know, tourism, visiting Najaf, where the airport are going to be. All of these are regional concerns, and they need to be dealt with in an open fashion.

First, I don’t see this situation as analogous to the Balkans, and so this strikes me as simply a case of an individual promoting a solution from past experience for no other reason than it worked before. Second, while dealing with issues like tourism and where the airport is going to be are ultimately interesting and important, they seem rather distant ones at the moment.

Whenever Clark engages in this kind of talk I have to wonder what in the world he is trying to accomplish, as it always comes across to me as nonsense aimed at sounding good, but with no substance behind it. Like Kerry’s constant call for more troops from our allies (when none were going to be forthcoming), calling for “more diplomacy� sounds really, really good, but is ultimately vacuous. (I mean, really: who is against diplomacy in the generic sense?)

Another thing that struck me was when Clark said this:

when generals are given senior command positions and they’ve had their entire lives and professional education in the military, they’re expected to have a body of professional knowledge and character that lets them stand up for what they believe. So we have a principle of civilian supremacy. No one doubts that the secretary of defense is ultimately in charge. He’s going to make the right decision or he’s going to make the right decision as he sees it. It’s up to the generals. If they feel he’s making the wrong decision, they fight it. If they feel it’s that significant, then they retire or resign from their position. Nobody’s done that. So whatever the thrashing around was, they are complicit in that decision, in those decisions. Whether they turn out to have been bad or not, that was military advice.
Now, we’ve all been in positions where we’ve disagreed with our bosses, and it turns out, you know, bosses normally don’t like that, so it’s a pretty unpleasant thing, and you’ve got to have people of character in uniform at high positions, and then you’ve got to trust the process. In this case, I don’t think the answers that came out of that process were good.

The other generals looked very uncomfortable with his assessment. Indeed, one interpretation of Clark’s statement is that essentially all the current generals should have resigned and that everyone and everything has been wrong in this policy. It further makes Clark sound arrogant and condescending vis-à-vis his fellow generals.

I think that McCaffrey is quite correct of the following in regards to the National Guard:

we’re going to damage fatally the National Guard if we try and continue using Reserve components at this rate. Forty percent of that force in Iraq right now is Reserve component. We have shot the bull. We’ve got to back off and build an Army and Marine Corps capable of sustaining these operations.

Overall it was an interesting roundtable.